Natural Selection and Multi-Level Causation by Martínez, Maximiliano & Moya, Andrés
In this  paper, using a multilevel approach, we defend the positive role of natural selection in 
the generation of organismal form. Despite the currently widespread opinion that natural 
selection only plays  a negative role in the evolution of form, we argue, in contrast, that the 
Darwinian factor is  a crucial (but not exclusive) factor in morphological organization. 
Analyzing some classic arguments, we propose incorporating the notion of ‘downward 
causation’ into the concept of ‘natural selection.’ In our opinion, this  kind of causation is 
fundamental to the operation of  selection as a creative evolutionary process. 
Maximiliano Martínez§ and Andrés Moya‡
Natural Selection and Multi-Level Causation
§ Departamento de Humanidades, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana-Cuajimalpa, 
Baja California 200 (5to Piso), DF 06760, Mexico
‡ Unidad Mixta de Investigación en Genómica y Salud CSISP/UVEG and Instituto Cavanilles de Biodiversidad 
y Biología Evolutiva, Avenida de Cataluña 21, 46020, Valencia, Spain
✉  E-mail: mmartinez@correo.cua.uam.mx
Received 24 April 2010; Revised 22 December 2010; Accepted 21 March 2011
KEYWORDS
Downward causation ● Levels of  hierarchical organization ● 
Natural selection ● Positive view
Whatever the cause may be of each slight difference in the offspring from their parents […] it is the steady 
accumulation, through natural selection, of such differences when beneficial to the individual, that gives rise to all the 
more important modifications of structure, by which the innumerable beings on the face of this earth are enabled to 
struggle with each other, and the best adapted to survive.
 — Darwin (1859, 170)
Novelties come from previously unseen association of  old material. To create is to recombine.
 — Jacob (1977, 1163)
1. Introduction
It is  generally held in various fields  that, with his  work published in 1859, Darwin explains and resolves 
the issue of the origination of complex biological traits  by proposing the process  called ‘natural selection.’ 
One of Darwin’s  achievements  was to give an answer in strictly naturalistic and mechanistic terms  to the 
riddle of design in nature as  opposed to the common theological explanation at that time, advocated mainly 
by William Paley (Paley 1836 [1802]; cf. Gould 1999; Ruse 1979). Indeed, it is well known that Paley’s  work 
greatly influenced Darwin’s  thinking (Ospovat 1981; Ruse 1979; Gould 1999). This  explanation of living 
design, brought about by a naturalistic phenomenon—natural selection—came to be one of the most 
successful aspects  of the Darwinian revolution. However, in recent decades  an important debate about the 
causal role played by natural selection in shaping the phenotypic traits  of organisms  has  arisen. The debate 
began with the criticisms  made by Karen Neander (1988, 1995a, b) of Elliott Sober’s  view of natural 
selection (Sober 1993 [1984], 1995), and has continued since. According to Sober, natural selection explains 
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the frequencies  of traits  in populations, not “why particular individuals have the traits  they have” (Sober 
1995, 385). Following Sober’s  reasoning, several authors have argued that selection has  no creative role in 
the origination and shaping of organisms’ traits. From this  viewpoint, now known as  ‘the negative view,’ 
natural selection is  considered as  a merely negative process, fulfilling only the function of filtering and 
distributing the percentage of variants  already existing in a population, which originated and were shaped 
by other biological means (Endler 1986; Walsh 1998; Ariew 2003; Pust 2004). This negative view opens  up a 
favorable area where other factors  present in the origins  of organismal form can be considered (e.g., 
developmental constraints  and self-organization, factors  that have traditionally been out of focus in 
evolutionary research), but it poses  the risk of ignoring (at least theoretically) a creative role that natural 
selection could play in this  process. The authors  that defend this  creative role of selection are on the other 
side of the debate (e.g., Neander 1988, 1995a, b; Matthen 1999, 2003; Forber 2005; Nanay 2005).1 The 
issue at stake is  whether or not natural selection plays  a creative causal role in the generation of organismal 
form, or is it merely a filter for unsuccessful forms originating via other biological factors.
The aims  of the present paper are twofold. Our first aim is  to reinforce the idea that the notion of 
‘negative natural selection’ is  too narrow of a concept to adequately capture the role that natural selection 
plays in evolution. To that end we examine some of the ideas  that are behind the debate between negative 
and positive views  of selection (Section 2). Second, we undertake, through a multilevel approach, the 
formulation of a positive concept of natural selection, which would provide a more far-reaching explanation 
for the creative potential it holds  (Section 3). We look at the works of Dobzhansky, Ayala, Neander, and 
Campbell, where it is  proposed that natural selection has  a direct causal influence on the creation of 
organismal traits. These works  provide the basis  for our conceptual revision. In conclusion we defend the 
importance of  downward causation as the underlying basis of  the creative ability of  natural selection.
2. Positive and Negative Views of  Natural Selection 
To understand the concepts of positive and negative natural selection, we mainly draw upon the debate 
between the philosophers  Elliott Sober (1993 [1984], 1995) and Karen Neander (1988, 1995a, b), to which 
many others have also contributed.2 The debate revolves around the role natural selection plays in evolution.
2.1 Natural selection as a negative factor
In The Nature of Selection (1993 [1984], 148ff) Sober has  persuasively argued that natural selection 
explains  the persistence and distribution of adaptations  in populations, emphasizing its  distributive causal 
role. He maintains  that in no way does  selection explain either the ontogenetic development of adaptive 
traits, less still their creation or origin. Sober provides  an illustrative example of the character of selective 
explanations  (1993 [1984], 149; 1995, 384): imagine a classroom where there are only children who have 
grade-three reading level proficiency. Now, if we ask ourselves  why these children have grade-three reading 
proficiency, we can respond in two ways. If we consider a developmental explanation, then we must explain 
how each child in the room gradually developed the ability to read, until reaching grade-three proficiency. If 
we consider the question of selection, we should find out which criteria were required to allow individuals  to 
be admitted to the room (in this  case, having grade-three reading proficiency). The point of this  example is 
clear and simple: evolutionary explanations based on natural selection are of the latter kind, i.e., calling 
upon selective explanations  for evolution focuses  on determining the reasons  why individuals  with a specific 
adaptive trait thrived and persisted from the past, over individuals  who did not have that trait. Thus: “the 
frequency of traits  in a population can be explained by natural selection, even though the possession of 
those traits  by individuals  in the population cannot” (Sober 1993 [1984], 152). To explain the origin of a 
trait in individuals  we must explain the processes  by which it originated or emerged in terms of mutations 
and mechanisms of  heredity:   
Natural selection does  not explain why I have an opposable thumb (rather than lack one). This  fact falls 
under the purview of the mechanism of inheritance... There are only two sorts  of individual-level facts 
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that natural selection may explain. It may account for why particular organisms  survive and why they 
enjoy a particular degree of reproductive success. But phenotypic and genotypic properties  of 
individuals—properties  of morphology, physiology and behavioral—fall outside of natural selection’s 
proprietary domain (Sober 1993 [1984], 152).
These ideas  have led many authors  to see Sober as  one of the main proponents  of the negative view of 
natural selection (Endler 1986; Neander 1988, 1995a, b; Matthen 1999, 2003; Pust 2004; Forber 2005; 
Nanay 2005; McLaughlin [manuscript in preparation]). As  Nanay put it: “Sober claims that selection is  a 
negative force: it does  not create; it only destroys” (Nanay 2005, 1101). Some points  are worth noting here. 
First, we believe that Sober’s  argument is correct: selection does  explain the frequencies  of traits  in 
populations, because it has  a distributive causal role in evolution. And it is this  distributive role of natural 
selection that lies  at the core of what is  known as  ‘the negative view.’ Second, we also think that an 
overemphasis  on this  distributive role can promote an unjustified implication, such as  that natural selection 
doesn’t have any creative role in the origination and shaping of organismal traits  (contrary to what Darwin 
thought). Beyond Sober’s  ideas  about the role of selection in evolution, it is  clear that on the negative view 
natural selection has an exclusively distributive role.3
Numerous  authors, both biologists  and philosophers, adopt and defend versions  that are compatible 
with the negative view of selection so far presented (Endler 1986; Saunders  1989; Gilbert et al. 1996; Walsh 
1998; West-Eberhard 2003; Ariew 2003; Müller 2003; Pust 2004; Kirschner and Gerhart 2005), which takes 
the discussion beyond the conceptual debate itself.4 An exclusive focus  on selection’s  distributive role has  had 
two direct results. First, it has  strengthened criticisms that the Modern Synthesis is  a partial and incomplete 
theory of evolution because it does  not address  the origins  and of organismal form. A common approach 
emerging from this  line of thought is  that if natural selection is not a causal factor in the generation of 
organismal form, then it is necessary to have recourse to other areas  of biology to explain this  fundamental 
and primary phenomenon (Saunders  1989; Müller and Newman 2003).5 Second, this  concept of natural 
selection has spread widely both in specialized and vernacular realms, supported by some intuitive ideas 
about the way natural selection operates  (filtering unsuccessful phenotypes).6 To sum up: according to the 
negative view, natural selection merely explains  frequencies of traits  in populations, traits  that originated and 
were formed strictly by biological factors other than selection.
2.2 Natural selection as a creative factor
From the contrary perspective, many authors  have advocated a positive causal role for natural selection 
in shaping the traits  of organisms  (Ayala 1970, 1993, 1999; Dobzhansky 1974; Jacob 1977; Dawkins  1986; 
Neander 1988, 1995a, b; Matthen 1999, 2003; Gould 2002; Forber 2005; Nanay 2005; Godfrey-Smith 
2009; McLaughlin [manuscript in preparation]). These authors  defend a creative role for selection in 
evolution that complements its  distributive role: selection is  a causal factor in the generation and 
organization of organismal form. To better understand this  capacity, we first point to important aspects  of 
Neander’s work on cumulative selection and then call attention to some ideas put forward by Dobzhansky.
In order to respond to Sober’s  view of selection, and in line with Ayala’s  (1970, 1993) reasoning in terms 
of probabilistic causes, Neander developed an argument to defend the creativity of natural selection based 
on the idea of the accumulation of successful selective events  (1988, 1995a, b).7 She distinguishes  two types 
of selection: single-step and cumulative. In a sequence that generates  random results and then chooses  one 
of them (Random/Selection sequence), single-step selection may involve multiple repetitions of the 
sequence, but these are isolated and not interconnected; for example, the tossing of a coin multiple times. By 
contrast, cumulative selection involves  multiple interconnected repetitions. Every new sequence starts  on the 
outcome of the previous one. The results  of each selection type differ greatly, due to how each one operates. 
In single-step selection, the outcome of each Random/Selection sequence is  isolated from the rest and does 
not alter the likely outcome of future sequences. By contrast, in cumulative selection each Random/
Selection sequence influences  and alters the possible outcomes  of future sequences, as  every sequence acts 
on the results  of the previous  one (except, of course, the first). The following example, which is  a 
modification of that used by Neander (1995a, 74), illustrates  the influence of cumulative selection on the 
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probability of the subsequent results of interconnected Random/Selection sequences  occurring. Imagine we 
have a box containing sixteen balls, half of which are numbered from ten to eighty in multiples of ten. At 
the bottom of the box there are eight holes  with the numbers 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70 and 80, into which, 
after spinning the box, the respective balls  should fall whose numbers  match; i.e., the ball with number 10 
into the 10th hole, the ball with 20 into the 20th hole, and so on. The probability that all eight balls  fall into 
their respective holes  after spinning the box is  extremely low. One might spend a lifetime trying again and 
again without ever succeeding. Now imagine that in the many attempts, each time a ball falls  into the right 
one of the eight holes, it stays  there from then on (it does not come out of its hole in the next spin).  Thus, 
after multiple spins, the probability of filling all eight holes with their respective balls  will be gradually and 
significantly increased.
How does  this  example relate to the process  of natural selection? The point is  that for Neander natural 
selection operates  as  a cumulative process, not as  a single step. In nature, a previous selection process  can 
greatly alter the probability of subsequent results  (translated into subsequent gene frequencies). This  impact 
of natural selection on the subsequent selection process  is  made possible through heredity, which can be seen 
via the following thought experiment (Neander 1995a, 77). Imagine we have three types  of genes: G1, G2 
and G3. G3 is  slightly better (in adaptive terms) than G2 and G2 is  slightly better than G1. G1 is  genetically 
closer to G2 than to G3 while G2 is  at the same genetic distance from G1 and G3. Now, if in a population 
strictly of G1 individuals, one of them mutates  to G2, causing the G2 trait to become established after 
several generations and displacing G1, then natural selection, having selected G2 and allowed it to become 
established due to its  higher level of fitness, has  greatly increased the likelihood of G3 emerging (for G3 is 
closer to G2 than to G1).8 As Neander says: “If there is  a small chance of an individual instance of [G2] 
mutating into [G3 ], the more instances  of [G2] there are, ceteris paribus, the larger the chance there is  of one 
instance of [G3 ] arising” (Neander 1995a, 77). This  reasoning allows her to state that: “Selection does more 
than merely distribute genotypes  and phenotypes  ... it plays  a crucial role [in] determining which new 
phenotypes  and genotypes  will emerge” (Neander 1995b, 585). Thus, in probabilistic terms, natural selection 
promotes change in the direction of increased adaptive design, provided that this increase implies  an 
increase in the fitness of carriers  of the trait. It is  in this  sense that Neander sees  natural selection as  a 
creative force.9
2.3 Dobzhansky’s ‘channeling’ and the non-isotropy of  variation
We hope, thus  far, to have shown the important difference between the two approaches to natural 
selection when providing an explanation for an organism’s  traits. If we follow the advocates  of negative 
natural selection, then selection is  far from playing a causal role in the generation of organismal form. If we 
subscribe to the contrary proposal, natural selection plays  a crucial causal role in generating adapted forms. 
However, at this  point, there is  a need to define more precisely the type of causation by which positive 
natural selection operates  creatively. The positive view analyzed so far is  focused on the genetic level, but 
analyzing the individual (or organismal) level now becomes necessary in order to have a better 
understanding of selection’s  causal role. As  we will see, the organismal level is  a key player in the process. 
Before going on to examine this  issue, we would like to dwell on the idea that natural selection is  creative in 
terms of what Dobzhansky put forward in one of his classic works, illustrating to some extent the type of 
causation to which we will refer in the following section. 
In “Chance and Creativity in Evolution” (Dobzhansky 1974), Dobzhansky explains  how natural 
selection is  creative through the accumulation of successful variations  to impose adaptive evolutionary 
direction in the formation of the traits  of organisms. In our view, one of the most important features  of his 
discussion is  the verb used to represent the causal action of natural selection in the process of giving 
adaptive evolutionary direction to a trait: to channel. Dobzhansky used “channel” to describe the adaptive 
direction or bias that natural selection imposes  on mutation and genetic recombination processes. The 
directions  of a gene mutation are determined by its  evolutionary history: “The mutational repertory of a 
gene is  a function of its  structure, and hence of the billions  of years  of its  evolution” (Dobzhansky 1974, 
315). Moreover, for Dobzhansky, the word ‘chance’ is  misused when talking about the origin of a mutation 
and its  effects. These assertions, in our opinion, have implications for evolutionary theory: variation 
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(produced by mutation and recombination) is  not isotropic, as  it is  conditioned by its  own history, which, in 
turn, is  conditioned by natural selection. In other words, what Dobzhansky emphasized is that the variation 
of  a gene is guided by its historical burden, which, in turn, has been channeled by natural selection.
[...] it must be stressed that selection puts  a restraint on chance and makes  evolution directional. Usually, 
but though not invariably, selection increases  the adaptedness  of the population to its  environments. It is 
responsible for the internal teleology ... so strikingly apparent in all living beings. The turmoil of 
mutation and recombination is  curbed and channeled in the direction of adaptedness  (Dobzhansky 1974, 
317, our emphasis).10
Dobzhansky’s  concept of channeling helps  to bring out some important aspects  of the causal processes  by 
which natural selection operates. Natural selection operates  on the material it has  formed previously—
material bounded and channeled by the accumulation of past selection events. This  fact is  what makes 
natural selection able to direct evolutionary change through the channels  it sets  itself. It is  true that selection 
can only work with existing material (Jacob 1977). The point here, as  stated by Dobzhansky, is  that this 
material is  already conditioned, channeled, and constrained by the discriminating and gradual action of past 
natural selection events. In other words, the accumulation of successful combinations  of variations  targeted 
by selection, generation after generation, channels  variation itself in specific directions. As is  stressed by 
Matthen (2003), this  channeling effect of natural selection is  present in Neander’s  approach. To put it 
abstractly, the emergence of G3 is  more probable when natural selection has  selected G2 over G1, because it 
has  channeled this  variation. Selection has  channeled mutation and recombination events  from G1 toward 
G3. We can extend the model forward and imagine a possible G4, a possible G5, etc., and also extend it 
backwards  and imagine a G0, a G-1, etc. The causal chain that would go from G-1 to G5 would be possible 
thanks  to the channeling of variation due to cumulative, sequential selection. As  Neander (1988, 425) puts  it: 
“Causal explanations  are elastic creatures. We can stretch the explanans back in time as  far as  our knowledge 
permits  and as  far as is  practical.” On the other hand, we can also say that, thanks  to the selection of specific 
individuals  and their subsequent reproduction, it is  possible to implant information of past events  of natural 
selection in an organism’s  DNA. In other words, through heredity, the history of previous  organisms  (of past 
generations) is  incorporated in the beginning of every new organism’s  developmental process. The result of 
this historical process is then present during an organism’s ontogeny.
Even though natural selection can operate at different levels  (Okasha 2006), we agree with Mayr (2002), 
Matthen (2003), and Okasha (2006) that selection operates  primarily on organisms, which is  the main factor 
in the evolution of their adaptive traits. “Natural selection leads  organisms  to evolve adaptations. The 
existence of organismic adaptations  ... shows the importance of organism-level selection in shaping the 
biota” (Okasha 2006, 12). This  is  consistent with the analysis  so far presented, because the action of 
selection at the individual level has two interlevel consequences: (a) choosing some individuals over others 
changes the distribution of individuals  in populations  because there will be more individuals  of the kind that 
natural selection selected than of the kind it rejected (recall Sober’s  room example); and, (b) this  process 
changes the configuration of the genetic pool of the population because there will be more genes in it of the 
individuals  that natural selection selected than genes of the individuals  that were not (recall Neander’s 
example, above). In this  sense, a fact occurring at the organismal level (selection choosing some individuals 
over others, according to fitness) has  effects  on both a higher level (characteristics  of populations) and a 
lower level (characteristics  of genetic pools). If we focus  on the latter relationship (individual and genetic 
levels), it is  possible to see the continuation of the process  because the genes  that are passed on will be the 
starting point of the new generation. The organisms that survive and reproduce will pass  their genes  to the 
next generation, channeling the kind of genes  that will be present subsequently (under most conditions, the 
genes  that come from the fitter organisms). And because this  process  is  cumulative (in Neander’s  sense), the 
more generations that pass in a population, the more specific kinds of genes  the genetic pool will have. It is 
this  ‘steady accumulation’ that produces historical channeling of variation (in Dobzhansky’s  sense), 
increasing the probability of  occurrence of  successful mutations and recombination. 
In the next section we describe the causal workings  of natural selection as  a case of downward causation 
between levels  of organization in the sense proposed by D.T. Campbell. In our view, the concept of 
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‘downward causation’ captures  and successfully reflects  a very important feature of the creative causation 
present in natural selection. 
3. Natural Selection and Downward Causation 
We urge that interlevel causation should feature centrally in explanatory hypothesis of  evolution. 
 — Vrba & Eldredge (1984, 146) 
3.1 Campbell and his causation proposal
The notion of downward causation has  been examined and referred to mainly in discussions  about 
reductionism, emergentism, hierarchical levels of biological organization, evolutionary epistemology, mental 
supervenience, systems  biology, and complex systems theory (Campbell 1974; Popper 1978; Sperry 1986; 
Kim 1992; Juarrero 1999; El-Hani and Emmeche 2000; Andersen et al. 2000; Bickhard and Campbell 
2003; Soto and Sonnenschein 2005; Noble 2006; Bedau 2008; Mitchell 2009). Currently, significant 
discussion is  underway not only with respect to the aforementioned topics but also for the whole conceptual 
framework of contemporary theoretical biology. This  is  why it is vital to analyze the relevance of downward 
causation to the concept of natural selection as  a positive causal factor. Although there has  been significant 
progress  in consolidating and understanding the phenomenon of downward causation (not without 
controversy), for our present purposes we will stick to the basic canonical exposition offered by Campbell. 
Our goal is  to link the notion of downward causation, in its  original (and therefore clear and robust) 
formulation with the argument for creative natural selection. For this  reason we ignore these discussions 
surrounding the phenomenology of  such causation, hoping to address them in the future in more detail. 
The theorist responsible for providing initial guidance for this  unorthodox idea of causation was Donald 
Campbell. His work has  become the foundation of many important subsequent works  on downward 
causation (as  noted above). Let us see what his  analysis  entails. Campbell (1974, 180ff) asserts  that nature is 
organized hierarchically into different levels: molecules, cells, tissues, organs, organisms, populations, species 
and ecosystems. Each of these levels  has  a factual reality and organizes  the actual existing units present in 
the lower level. He proposes the principle of downward causation to refer to the influence that higher levels 
exert on lower ones and links it with the operation of  natural selection. 
[The principle of downward causation]: Where natural selection operates, through life and death at a 
higher level of organization, the laws  of the higher-level selective system determine in part the 
distribution of lower-level events  and substances  ... All processes  at the lower levels  of a hierarchy are 
restrained by and act in conformity to the laws of  the higher levels (Campbell 1974, 180).
Grouping together numerous generations  of temporarily successive self-replicating entities  is  useful for 
understanding the central point that the concept of downward causation attempts  to reflect: the states  and 
events of entities  at a higher level exert causal influence (in the future) on their own subsequent replications. 
This is  the way in which generationally successive entities  of a higher level establish a causal connection; i.e., 
through the influence exerted on future lower-level entities, which, in turn, are responsible for the 
construction of new higher-level entities  (in a typical process of upward causation). In this  case, Campbell is 
considering the reciprocal causal relationship between two levels (through a replication process): the 
organismal (phenotype) and the molecular (genotype).
To make the matter clearer we shall reconstruct the example that Campbell (1974, 181) uses  to illustrate 
the action of downward causation and its  relationship with natural selection. If we consider the anatomy of 
the jaws  of a worker termite or ant, we note that the ligaments  and muscle surface obey the laws  of 
mechanics  (Archimedes lever), and are designed optimally to apply maximum force at a determined distance 
from the joint. This  fact agrees  with physics, but is  different from that implied by molecular processes, which 
are those that govern the production of specific proteins building the muscle and shell of the mandibular 
system. Such macro-mechanical laws  operate at the level of organisms. Thus, according to Campbell, in 
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order to understand and explain the particular and exact distribution of proteins that make up the jaw as 
well as  the corresponding specific DNA sequence, which are at the lower level (molecular), it is  necessary to 
determine the laws of the lever at the higher level (organisms).  For Campbell, this is one of the processes 
that involves  both directions  of causation, as it is  organism-scale natural selection that determines  (causes) 
what specific types  of proteins are present at the molecular level, although the immediate micro-
determination (cause) is  in the direction of DNA→protein→jaw. Thus  the events  at a higher level of 
organization (individuals) partly determine the permanence, formation, and distribution of the organization 
of entities at lower levels  (DNA), which in turn will subsequently reproduce, through upward causation, new 
higher-level entities. 
In other words, the adaptive success  or failure of certain higher-level entities has  a decisive effect on the 
future presence and distribution of the lower-level entities  that (re)produce them. The adaptive role of ants’ 
jaws determines  the continuity or disappearance of the DNA strands that produce them. It is  in this  sense 
that higher-level entities, through downward causation, have an impact on future events  in both entities  of 
the same level (individuals) and the lower levels that compose them (DNA).
3.2 Revising the concept of  natural selection
We think that the notion of downward causation proposed by Campbell helps  enormously in capturing 
the positive action of natural selection between levels. Linking this  notion of downward causation (which 
focuses  on the organismal level) with the proposed positive selection of Ayala, Neander, and Dobzhansky 
(which focuses on the genetic level), we can better understand how the selective events  that occur at a time t 
at a higher level determine certain entities  that later appear at the lower level, all in a reproductive chain. 
Natural selection at the individual (higher) level determines which genetic material (lower level) will prevail 
and which will disappear in the following generation(s). The relationship between downward causation and 
natural selection is  possible thanks to the phenomenon of heredity. It is  precisely this  type of top-down 
causation that allows  natural selection to determine and channel the material upon which future variation 
will emerge, where it will again subsequently operate. As  noted above, the main selective factor promoting 
the channeling of the genetic material does  not operate directly at the genetic level; it does  so at the level of 
the individual. But the top-down connection between the two levels  is  possible through downward causation. 
The selection of specific individuals  progressively influences, through downward causation, the composition 
of the genetic pools, making the appearance of successful genetic combinations  more probable. In our view, 
this  fundamental multilevel fact demands  a revision of the concept of natural selection; we must incorporate 
the notion of downward causation into our conception of natural selection. This reformulation would 
enable us to define more clearly the positive causal role that natural selection plays in the production and 
pattern that organismal form takes. 
In the action of natural selection, operating at a higher level and influencing in turn the future of the 
lower level material, it is  possible discern four central points: (1) the influence of natural selection on future 
genetic material is  exerted through downward causation; (2) this  influence orients  the channels  of 
evolutionary direction that natural selection imposes upon the material; (3) every selection event operates  on 
the material that natural selection has  historically been channeling over successive generations  of a lineage; 
and, (4) by influencing future genetic material (lower level), individuals  (higher level) that are made up of 
such genetic material can, by transitivity, also be influenced.
Having said this, we think it is  appropriate to clarify a couple of points regarding our analysis  of the 
relationship between downward causation and natural selection. First, it is  necessary to start from the 
uncontroversial assumption of the existence of real, biological, hierarchically organized levels, and that they 
are causally related. The second relevant clarification is  that the downward causation proposed does  not lead 
to two types  of ontologically separate causal actions  (upward and downward causation), but rather it draws 
attention to how a series  of the same type of causal events  is  concatenated as  a historical continuum of 
multiple steps. If we consider a single step, then we observe an upward causal relationship; on the contrary, 
if we consider a sequence of steps, we will see the action of downward causation. That is, the way of 
understanding the creativity of natural selection implies  understanding its  influence, through heredity, on the 
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process  of upward causation in every generation of individuals. Put differently, the way in which natural 
selection can be creative is  through its  influence on the future of upward causation processes  initiated by 
DNA. It is  for this  reason that we must consider at least two generations  to understand how it works  (Figure 
1). But at the same time one must consider a sequence of many interrelated generations  to understand the 
process  of creativity itself and see its  cumulative effects—the greater the accumulation, the greater the 
channeling effect on DNA (Figure 2). Thus, natural selection, through downward causation, exerts  its 
influence from the very moment the process  of upward causation in the subsequent generation begins  (as  in 
the example given by Campbell), but its  cumulative and creative effects are more powerful via the 
channeling effects  that have taken place over a large number of generations, leading up to the construction, 
in evolutionary time, of an organ as  complex as  the vertebrate eye (for example). Given that Figure 1 
represents  a diachronic feedback process  (the transition between two generations) that can be iterated and 
accumulated throughout evolution, the details  of this  graph can be simplified in order to see how several 
generations  are linked through heredity (Figure 2). If the three sets  of arrows  in Figure 2 are taken as  a 
causal continuum, it is  possible to observe the influence of and channeling produced by a past selective event 
on any subsequent event. Any point of the continuum is  conditioned by its  past events  and it will condition 
its  future events, due to the channeling effects  of downward and upward causation operating together. Thus, 
genetic, developmental, and selective processes, which occur at different levels of biological organization, are 
causally connected and determine each other in evolution. Selection affects, in this  way, the source of 
variation.
One must bear in mind that by proposing that biological organization is  the result of a feedback process 
of upward and downward causation between levels, we are simply suggesting the necessity of adopting a 
multilevel causal approach in order to understand the channeling effect produced by a long succession of 
events that are historically linked. Our analysis  shows  the necessity of incorporating the concept of 
downward causation to explain the causally creative role of natural selection. A process  like natural selection 
Figure 1 — A particular genetic configuration (CG1) in a population (plus epigenetic laws) constructs a particular 
kind of  phenotypes (CP′) (represented by the solid arrow in an upward direction). Some of  these phenotypes, 
once developed, will be selected by natural selection (NS) according to their fitness (black wide arrow). The 
selected phenotypes (CP′′) will be the ones that leave offspring and pass their specific genes (through genetic 
heredity laws) to the next generation (represented by the dashed arrow in a downward direction), producing the 
new particular genotypic configuration (CG2). This new configuration, in turn, will construct the new 
phenotypes.11
Levels of  
Organization
DNA
Organisms
CG1
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
CG2
CP′ CP′′
NS
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can, in this  way, affect the kinds  and distribution of DNA templates  leading to the generation of complex 
morphology.12 
4. Conclusion  
We have argued that the process  of natural selection occurs in two steps: the blind (though neither 
isotropic nor equiprobable) generation of variation (through mutation or recombination, for example), and 
the subsequent (non-random) selection of this  variation through differential replication. In this  conception, 
both negative and positive views  of natural selection are combined. But it is  also possible to state that events 
of (negative) selection, if taken cumulatively, are a positive evolutionary factor—selection influences  the 
generation of variation as  well as  the sorting of which variants  increase in frequency. By choosing which 
phenotypes  reproduce, natural selection affects  the genetic configuration of the next generation(s). By 
influencing genetic configurations, selection positively affects  the sources  of variation. Recalling Neander’s 
argument, if we consider only isolated and unrelated sequences  of random-variation/selection events  then 
we do not explain the particular configuration of gene sequences  that leads to complex adaptations. On the 
other hand, if we focus on the relationships of numerous gene sequences  interconnected and causally 
channeled by the downward influence of selection that reproduction allows, we explain how, in this  strict 
sense, natural selection affects  the generation of form and the evolutionary direction it takes. Downward 
causation successfully explains  the type of multilevel causation operating in the natural selection process, 
while capturing the cumulative and creative action of the latter. For this  reason it is  useful to incorporate this 
type of causation in any definition of natural selection that seeks  to explain the creative power it possesses. 
This reformulation of the concept of natural selection is  based on the inclusion of the concept of downward 
causation. We believe our proposal addresses not only Darwin’s  intuition that natural selection was a creative 
force, but simultaneously strengthens  and advances  the work of post-Darwinian authors who have addressed 
the same issue. By highlighting the mutual co-determination between levels  of organization in the process  of 
natural selection we have recovered and articulated a multilevel perspective that is  absent from previous 
discussions. Ayala’s, Neander’s, and Dobzhansky’s  analyses  are focused on the genetic level, which, in our 
Time
Figure 2 — Iteration of  the process depicted in Figure 1. This illustrates a sequence of  several generations of  
organisms causally linked through reproduction. Solid arrows represent the construction, depending on the 
genotypic configuration at a time tx, of  particular phenotypes, in a typical process of  upward causation. Any 
single phenotype produced will, at the organismal level, interact with other phenotypes and the environment 
(feeding, mating, etc.), being an object of  natural selection according to fitness (black horizontal arrows). 
Selection chooses which phenotypes will pass their genes to the next generation(s). Dashed arrows represent 
this downward influence of  selection, at time ty, on the arrangement of  the DNA that will construct the new 
phenotypes.
Levels of  
Organization
DNA
Organisms
t1... tn
NS NS NS
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opinion, is  just a (correct) part of the story. Needless  to say, our work reflects  a pluralistic spirit regarding 
causation. As Hitchcock (2003, 1) has recently said, “The goal of a philosophical account of causation 
should not be to capture the causal relation, but rather to capture the many ways  in which the events  of the 
world can be bound together.”
Finally, we do not intend to argue that natural selection is  the only factor that determines  the direction 
taken by organic forms  in their evolution. There are other equally important factors, such as  developmental 
constraints  or self-organization. These and other evolutionary factors, in conjunction with natural selection, 
come together as  a plurality of positive causes  that give direction to the evolution of form. It is  the task of 
the newly created discipline of Evo-Devo to discriminate, in each particular morphological case, whether a 
trait obeys one factor more than another. The generation of organismal form is  a complex process  and that 
is  why we think multilevel approaches  that take into account diverse levels  of organization, multiple 
directions of  causation, and different time scales offer better prospects for understanding it.
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Notes
1.  Neander (1995a) dubbed the two views on selection the ‘negative view’ and the ‘positive view.’ Pust (2004) divides 
the positions this way: Sober, Walsh, Lewens,  and himself as supporters of the negative view, Neander and 
Matthen as defenders of the positive view. Nowadays, we can include the philosophers Forber, Nanay, Godfrey-
Smith, and McLaughlin in the positive group. Matthen (2003) calls  the negative view ‘Anti-individualism’ and the 
positive view ‘Individualism.’
2.  Two things are worth noting here. First, we agree with McLaughlin (manuscript in preparation) that all the 
philosophical treatments post-Sober that defend the negative view are mere refinements of Sober’s original points, 
not substantial additions. Second, the issue of negative vs. positive views reaches beyond this philosophical debate 
because many biologists embrace the negative perspective without referring to the controversy (see below, Note 4). 
The controversy seems to invoke more than semantic issues as it deals with the nature of selection, its evolutionary 
role, and its epistemological status.
3.  The criticisms of Sober could be justified partly by the fact that there is no clear treatment, at least in Sober’s  book 
(1993 [1984]) or in his reply to Neander (1995a),  of the creative capacity of natural selection and its relationship to 
the distributive role he advocates. But it is also true that Sober mentions, in other places, that selection has a 
creative role in the evolution of complex traits  (e.g., in his  discussion of evolution vs. creationism; 1993,  36ff). 
However, it is  not our aim to undertake an exegetical analysis of Sober’s work on selection and evaluate whether its 
criticisms are justified. We simply aim to underscore the ideas that support the negative view and point out some of 
the consequences of  taking these too literally, as many authors have done.
4.  For example,  Kirschner and Gerhart (2005, 13) argue that, “There are limits  to what natural selection can do. We 
must remember that it acts merely as a filter, preserving some variants and rejecting others, natural selection does 
not create variation.” West-Eberhard (2003, 197) agrees: “Research into selection and adaptation can tell us  why a 
trait persisted and spread, but cannot tell where the trait came from.” Saunders (1989, 33) in turn states that, 
“Selection can only retain, disseminate or remove variants  that are already present in the population, it cannot, in 
itself, create new variants  ...  a theory so firmly focused on the destructive forces rather than the creative, cannot be 
but seriously incomplete.” In the same vein, Gilbert et al. (1996, 368) affirm this perspective: “The role of natural 
selection in evolution, however, is  seen to play less  an important role. It is merely a filter for unsuccessful 
morphologies generated by development.” Similarly,  Endler (1986, 46) holds that, “Natural selection is  not an 
explanation for adaptation, it only explains why and how, relatively, the best adaptations may increase in 
frequency ...  Natural selection is the problem of the spread of new variants  or new adaptations, not their origin.” 
For a similar idea of  negative natural selection, prior to Sober, see Ohno (1970). 
5.  The dictum that variation comes from mutation and natural selection distributes  (chooses or reject) it in 
populations does not seem controversial. But some authors  see this simple process as the base of an incomplete 
theory of evolution: if variations come from blind, isotropic, and random mutations, how can we explain shape 
and order in biological forms? Not by selection,  because it just filters variations already present. They were, then, 
entirely shaped by other means (such as  by developmental processes). And given that the Modern Synthesis left out 
development (Hamburger 1980),  it is an incomplete theory of evolution (cf.  Saunders 1989; Müller and Newman 
2003). 
6.  The negative view is  supported by compelling metaphors repeatedly associated with the process of selection 
(Neander 1995a; McLaughlin [manuscript in preparation]): selection acts as a ‘filter’ that eliminates  less fit 
individuals (and their adaptations), or like a ‘gardener’s  shears’ that prune the tree of life. Both the variants to be 
filtered and the branches to be pruned exist prior to filtering or pruning, which means that natural selection (be it a 
filter or shears) plays no role in their origin. 
MARTÍNEZ AND  MOYA — SELECTION AND MULTI-LEVEL CAUSATION
OPEN ACCESS - Freely Available at philosophyandtheoryinbiology.org
13
7.  Ayala (1970, 1993) has illustrated the generation of novelty by natural selection with the following example, which 
focuses on the increase in the probability of successful gene combinations. Escherichia coli is a bacterium that needs 
the amino acid histidine to grow.  If we put a few bacteria into a growth medium with 1 milliter of histidine, then 
these will multiply and, in a couple of hours, there will be two to three billion.  In this  bacterium, sporadic 
mutations conferring resistance to the antibiotic streptomycin occur on the order of one per one hundred million. 
If we add streptomycin to our bacterial culture, only twenty to thirty will survive, which,  again, will multiply and 
within hours there will be twenty to thirty million,  all of which will be resistant to this  antibiotic. Likewise,  sporadic 
mutations of E. coli that are able to grow without histidine occur on the order of four per one hundred million. If 
we transfer our new population of bacteria to a histidine-free medium, only a few hundred will survive. These in 
turn will multiply and in a few hours there will again be two to three billion, all resistant to streptomycin and also 
able to grow without histidine. Thus, while the probability of both mutations occurring spontaneously in the same 
bacterium is four in ten billion,  natural selection has produced bacteria with these characteristics in just two steps. 
For Ayala, it is  in this sense that selection can be called creative: natural selection gives rise to gene combinations 
that would otherwise be highly unlikely. “Natural selection has been compared to a sieve which retains the rarely 
arising useful and lets go the more frequently arising harmful mutations. Natural selection acts  in that way, but it is 
much more than a purely negative process, for it is  able to generate novelty by increasing the probability of 
otherwise extremely improbable genetic combinations. Natural selection is creative in a way” (Ayala 1970, 5). If we 
see the role of selection as merely distributive, then we will miss the creative role that is also present in this 
example.
 
8.  As Godfrey-Smith (2009, 42),  agreeing with the positive view of natural selection, has  put it. Forber (2005) refines 
Neander’s (1995a) argument in combination with a point made by Endler (1986). There are two important things 
worth noting about Forber’s approach. First, he distinguishes between traits affected by a single factor and traits 
affected by multiple factors. 
	 	
	 	 Consider two loci of a haploid organism, each with two competing alleles. Locus one has  the alleles  A and a 
	 while locus two has B and b.  Individuals with the AB combination do much better than those with Ab,  aB, ab. 
	 If the AB combination emerges,  then it should quickly dominate the population. Now we ask how the AB 
	 combination can evolve from a population made up of only ab individuals. The role of selection becomes clear 
	 when we consider two contrasting cases, one with a selective gradient and one without. In the first case the 
	 combinations  Ab and aB do better than ab but not AB; this represents the selective gradient. In the second, Ab, 
	 aB, ab all do equally well.  The selective gradient in the first case makes it much more likely for the AB 
	 combination to emerge (Forber 2005, 332).
	
 According to Forber, we see the explanatory role of natural selection when a combination of factors affects a trait
(in this case, the successful genetic combination). But he adds: “On Neander’s  view cumulative selection has a 
privileged explanatory status  because previous  trials affect the probability of later outcomes. But selection must do 
this  in the right way by accumulating the multiple beneficial factors  that affect a given trait” (2005, 334).  We agree 
with Godfrey-Smith that Forber’s approach is a refinement of Neander’s  argument, but we don’t see anything 
substantially new—both Neander’s example of the box with holes and numbered balls,  and her reasoning about 
the necessity of the sequential order of mutations in the G1, G2, and G3 case, implicitly refer to the combination of 
factors. The second thing we want to highlight in Forber’s paper is  his interesting reference to Endler (1986). 
Forber (2005, 341) uses Endler’s argument about the capacity of selection for explaining the origins of traits. 
Neander’s, Forber’s, and Endler’s arguments and reasoning are very similar in this respect. The curious thing is 
that Endler endorses Sober’s negative view (see above, Note 4)!
9.  Despite disagreements between philosophers on how probabilistic causation should be characterized, this approach 
is  now (since Suppes 1970) common in philosophy and in science (Dowe and Noordhof 2004). We mention this 
because Ayala and Neander’s  (as well as Forber’s) views of selection rest on probabilistic reasoning. They take 
selection as  a factor that leads to the increase of the probability of the occurrence of particular events  (i.e.,  it raises 
the probability of the appearance of fitter genetic combinations). For a precursor in the discussion of natural 
selection and probabilistic causation, see Hodge (1987). For an argument based on probability and counterfactuals 
that defends the positive view of  selection, see Nanay (2005).
10. A very similar point was made by Jacob, three years  later, in his classic “Evolution and Tinkering”: “But natural 
selection does not act merely as  a sieve eliminating detrimental mutations and favoring reproductions of beneficial 
ones, as is often suggested. In the long run,  it integrates mutations, and orders them into adaptively coherent 
patterns adjusted over millions  of years, and over millions  of generations as a response to environmental 
challenges. It is natural selection that gives direction to changes, orients chance, and slowly, progressively produces 
more complex structures, new organs, and new species. Novelties come from previously unseen association of old 
material. To create is to recombine” (Jacob 1977, 1163). 
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11. 	We are grateful to one of the referees for suggesting how to improve Figures 1 and 2 by reference to a graph from 
Lewontin (1974, 14). The suggestion was very useful.
12. It is worth mentioning that we do not use the common distinction between proximate and ultimate causes 
intentionally. Mayr (1961) introduced the dichotomy to distinguish evolutionary biology from molecular 
approaches, after which it was mainly used to refer to developmental processes as proximate and irrelevant to 
evolutionary explanations (Amundson 2005, 212).  In his reply to Beatty, Mayr claims that there are two different 
kinds  of causal processes in evolution and development—ultimate and proximate, respectively: to associate them is 
a hopeless task because they are unrelated (Mayr 1994, 357). But, as Amundson has pointed out, the proximate-
ultimate distinction deals  with kinds  of explanations  rather than with causation itself. He also argues that the 
dichotomy could be construed as  a matter of degree:  ontogeny can be “conceived as an intermediary stage 
between ancestral selection and an adult trait … [as  an] in-between point in the ultimate-proximate 
scale” (Amundson 2005, 204). We agree. If evolution and development are causally co-determined, a contrastive 
model is not useful to refer to the relationship between them. Biological causation, as is involved in the generation 
and shaping of organismal form, seems to be a complex matter that cannot be captured by Mayr’s  dichotomy. It 
should be noted that some defenders of the negative view of selection could be adopting the dichotomy as an 
ontological commitment; they see ultimate selective causes as unrelated to proximate developmental ones.  See 
Plutynski (2008) for arguments  to avoid the dichotomy and use wider causal frameworks  in biology. For an analysis 
of  the asymmetrical relationships between macro- and micro-causes, see Shapiro and Sober (2007).
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